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Economic Development Through State Ownership of Oil and Gas: 





 Government owners of petroleum subsurface rights often face constituent 
pressure to exercise control over the disposition of these resources in pursuit of 
economic development objectives. At the same time, states cannot simply dissipate the 
potential rent from their resources without losing a principal revenue source. The paper 
takes a retrospective look at the state of Alaska's policies and programs regarding 
disposition of oil and gas resources, focusing on the evolution of the royalty-in-kind 
program. It examines the relative success of different programs in achieving objectives 
of import substitution and value-added export relative to the cost in foregone revenue. 
The analysis leads to general conclusions about programs of this type, along with 
specific insights as the state prepares to embark on the biggest test yet related to the 




Economic Development Through State Ownership of Oil and Gas: 
 Evaluating Alaska's Royalty-in-Kind Program 
 
Introduction 
 Governments in remote regions often possess few options for economic 
development. At the same time, their narrow economic base provides few options for 
raising revenue. A dilemma arises for such states that are fortunate enough to own 
rights to rich natural resource assets. Constituent pressures to exercise control over the 
disposition of these resources in pursuit of development objectives may conflict with 
constituent pressures to fund public services. Governments in remote resource-rich 
regions can stimulate economic development by giving away their natural resources to 
sponsors of projects that promise attractive economic benefits. Yet such states cannot 
simply dissipate the potential rent from their resources without losing a principal revenue 
source.  
 The greatest potential for conflict between these two objectives occurs in oil-
producing states, because the economic rents -- and associated revenues -- from oil are 
so large. Alaska is unique among North American sovereign jurisdictions in its per-capita 
state-owned petroleum wealth. The challenge of economic development in Alaska's 
remote, petroleum-based economy in some ways more closely resembles that of oil-rich 
developing nations than it resembles that of other US states and Canadian provinces. In 
other respects, Alaska's situation resembles that of other remote regions in more 
developed nations (Morehouse and Huskey, 1992). The state of Alaska's experience 
with balancing the conflicting pressures over the use of oil and gas for revenue 
enhancement versus economic development provides a laboratory for understanding the 
opportunities and limits to government-sponsored development programs based on 
natural resources. Alaska attempted to resolve the dilemma by leasing its oil lands 
competitively, while retaining the option to dispose of its royalty share  -- the share 
retained by the landowner of oil and gas produced from leased lands -- in kind to 
prospective industrial developers. 
 In this paper, I discuss how the State of Alaska has approached the tradeoff 
between revenue and development through administration of its royalty-in-kind program. 
In the next section I provide the economic context by summarizing the state's 
development problem and the role that disposition of the royalty share could play in 
economic development. Next, I review the history of the state's policy and programs for 
the disposition of its royalty oil and gas. Then, I discuss the outcomes of the program, 
describing  industrial facilities built, economic benefits, and impacts on state oil 
revenues. I also discuss disposals that failed to achieve their promise. Following the 
analysis of outcomes, I evaluate the program to try to explain the pattern of successes 
and failures, and analyze their implications for likely future royalty disposals. I conclude 
with broader lessons for economic development policy for Alaska, other remote regions, 
and for developing areas with petroleum resources. 
 
Petroleum and Alaska Economic Development  
 The United States is one of the few nations in the world in which petroleum and 
other subsurface resources may be privately owned. The history of oil and gas 
development in most of the nation is a history of struggles among private owners over 
the development and disposition of petroleum (Lovejoy and Homan, 1975; McDonald, 
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1971). Two factors made Alaska an exception to this rule when it entered the union in 
1959. First, the federal government awarded the new state a 102-million-acre land 
entitlement, including subsurface rights, to be selected from unreserved public domain. 
Second, the 1953 Submerged Lands Act settling intergovernmental disputes over 
offshore resources had recently awarded coastal states offshore mineral rights within 
three miles of land. Alaska's long coastline entitled the state to a vast nearshore estate. 
The geology was fortuitous, rewarding the state handsomely with oil and gas resources 
on both onshore and offshore entitlements. 
Objectives and constraints of economic development 
  At the time Alaska entered the union, oil and gas resources in the Cook Inlet 
region were seen as key to the new state's economic viability (Rogers, 1962). Discovery 
of the largest field in North America at Prudhoe Bay in 1964 entrenched and enhanced 
Alaska's status as a petroleum state. The oil and gas industry provided new high-paying 
jobs, but many of these were held by non-resident workers.1 "Downstream" vertical 
integration in the form of petroleum refining and petrochemical industries provided a 
logical opportunity for increasing resident employment and other economic benefits from 
oil and gas production. Downstream development does not remove the link to world 
energy markets, so it does not really make the state economy less dependent on 
petroleum. Nevertheless, it provides a direct opportunity to increase value added in the 
state from the state's resource endowment. 
 Alaska economists have defined three objectives for regional industrial 
development. New industry can (1) increase jobs and personal income, (2) expand the 
state and local tax base, and (3) increase share of economic activity retained in the 
region (increase the economic multiplier) (Kresge et al., 1984: 192). To these one might 
add a fourth objective of providing benefits to regional consumers. Consumers benefit 
from development that reduces the cost of living or cost of doing business, or provides 
products and services that were not previously available locally. This was a particularly 
relevant objective in Alaska in the 1960s, where the high cost of living and high cost of 
business posed significant barriers to economic development and diversification. 
 Two key factors that determine how expansion of different industries might 
differently achieve the development objectives are: (1) whether wages in the industry are 
relatively low or high, and (2) the relative capital intensity (Kresge et al., 1984: 198-199). 
Oil and gas processing industries are capital intensive -- meaning that they provide 
relatively few jobs as a percentage of value added -- but those jobs are highly skilled and 
pay high wages (Tussing and Kramer, 1981). Consequently, one would expect that 
petroleum processing would be provide relatively few permanent jobs, but relatively 
more enhancement to the property tax base and per-capita income. 
 The geology and economics that allow large quantities of oil and gas to be 
produced in Alaska do not guarantee that petroleum processing in the state will be 
feasible. Alaska faced -- and still does face -- significantly higher construction costs 
relative to the nation as a whole. In addition, its remote location makes relative 
transportation costs of raw materials and manufactured products a key factor in 
economic viability. Crude oil is very inexpensively moved around the globe by tanker. 
Natural gas, because of its lower value per volume and the expense to liquefy for marine 
transport, is relatively expensive to move long distances. Refined products and 
                                                          
1Although major oil companies made a concerted effort to move employees to Alaska, non-
resident workers still represent 28 percent of oil industry employees (Fried and Windisch-Cole, 
2003). 
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petrochemicals are typically more expensive to move than crude oil but less expensive 
to move than natural gas over long distances.  
 These basic facts led Tussing and Kramer (1981: 114) to postulate three axioms 
for location of petroleum processing facilities based on the transportation economics of 
oil and gas: 
(1) Petroleum refineries tend to be located near their markets. 
(2) Naptha and gas-oil based petrochemical plants tend to be located near 
refineries. 
(3) Natural-gas-based petrochemical plants tend to be located near raw-
materials sources. 
As a result, transportation economics disfavor Alaska locations for export petroleum 
refineries and oil-based petrochemical plants, but might favor refineries to serve in-state 
needs. Transportation economics favor converting Alaska gas to petrochemicals in-
state, if anywhere (Tussing and Kramer, 1981: 115). 
Import substitution vs. export-led growth 
 Traditional economic wisdom holds that the path to economic development in less-
developed regions is through trade; that is, through increased exports. This maxim 
definitely applies to resource development in remote regions, where exporting minerals 
to world markets provides the most obvious opportunity for growth. Traditional Alaska 
"basic" industries such as fisheries, tourism, mining, and forest products, as well as oil 
and gas, are examples of trade-dependent exports. In Alaska, especially in the early 
years of statehood, however, federal civilian and military government employment 
provided the largest source of basic industry employment. Federal government 
employment is an export industry in the sense that the demand for the services is 
determined by forces external to the state; i.e., the U.S. Congress.  
Figure 1 illustrates the shares of Alaska employment by major industry in 1965, and 
compares 1965 total employment and employment shares to those in 2001. In 1965 the 
federal government was by far Alaska's largest employer, employing 50,000 civilian and 
military workers -- nearly one in two Alaskan workers. All resource industries and tourism 
combined employed only about 11,000 workers, or 10 percent of the total. The budget 
shares for 2001 contrast sharply with those of 1965. One obvious difference is the 
decline in federal government employment (largely due to military staff cutbacks), and 
the growth in oil and gas and state employment. But by far the biggest change in 
numbers is the growth in support sector employment. This sector, composed primarily of 
trade services, grew sevenfold. This growth was largely accomplished through import 




Figure 1. Alaska Employment: 1965 vs. 2001


































  Import substitution also an option to export-led growth in the manufacturing 
sector. Tuck et al. (1988) used national data to analyze what manufacturing industries 
were present in Alaska in the 1980s. One of their principal findings was that nearly all 
manufacturing industries then in Alaska directly served either a basic industry or final 
consumer demand. That is, Alaska produced relatively few intermediate goods: inputs to 
other manufacturers. In contrast, the majority of manufacturing industries nationally (at 
the 4-digit SIC level) produced intermediate goods. Another finding was that a much 
higher share of Alaska industries than U.S. industries had high transport costs: 60 
percent vs. 30 percent. They defined a high-transportation-cost industry as one for which 
more than three percent of total costs typically paid for transportation. These findings 
suggest that successful Alaska manufactures are industries that are either favored by a 
location close to consumers, or have other geographic limitations on location (such as 
needing to be near a key input with very high transport costs) (Tuck et al., 1988: III.B.4-
5). 
 Another structural feature of the Alaska economy bears on the import-substitution 
vs. export-led growth question: the state a big petroleum-based fuel-user. Geography -- 
Alaska's remoteness and sparse population density -- requires that the state burn a lot of 
fuel per capita in transportation.  Its industrial base other than oil -- fishing, tourism, 
logging, mining, and aviation -- all rely on refined petroleum products as essential 
production inputs. The statistics confirm these intuitive observations. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) 2001 data show that Alaska consumes more than three times as 
much energy per capita as the U.S. average -- 30 percent more per capita than the next 
most energy-intensive state (Wyoming).  Even without an industrial base using 
petroleum as feedstock for petrochemicals, Alaska consumes nearly 3.5 times as much 
petroleum products per capita as the nation, and nearly 40 percent more than the next 
highest state (Louisiana). Still, the total amount -- about 140 thousand barrels per day -- 
is relatively small.  
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Economies of scale 
 The relatively small size of the Alaska economy can discourage production for 
local use if there are economies of scale in manufacturing. Petroleum refining and 
petrochemical manufactures, like most chemical process industries, have substantial 
economies of scale (Tussing and Kramer, 1981). Scherer et al. (1975) compiled 
information on minimum efficient scales (MES) -- the smallest size plant that achieves 
competitive costs -- for a variety of manufacturing industries based on technology 
available in 1967. They reported an MES for petroleum refining of 1.9 percent of 
production (Scherer et al., 1975: 80). Using EIA historical consumption data, this 
translates into a throughput of roughly 230 thousand barrels per day (Mb/d), 
substantially more than current Alaska consumption and nearly eight times consumption 
in 1965. 
 Scherer et al. (1975: 91) also computed the cost disadvantage for plants operating 
less than the MES. For petroleum refining, a plant with a capacity of one-third the MES 
in 1967 (approximately 70 Mb/d) faced a cost disadvantage of 4.8 percent relative to an 
MES plant. For an Alaskan refinery at a scale appropriate for serving the local market in 
the late 1960s, the projected cost disadvantage might be closer to ten percent. 
 Petroleum refining will produce a mix of products, not all of which have a market in 
Alaska. Even configured to maximize recovery of fuels that have large Alaskan demand, 
a local refinery would have to find a market for some products outside the state. The 
combination of economies of scale, process limits on the product mix in refinery runs, 
and the size of Alaska's product markets suggest that a refinery producing for the local 
market could face significant cost disadvantages that might not be able to be offset by 
higher transportation costs for competitors' imported petroleum products. It is in this 




 Many states and the federal government have RIK programs. Alaska has been 
more aggressive in pursuing this option than other states. Since 1969, Alaska has made 
upwards of 30 sales involving more than 800 million barrels of oil, or just over half of all 
state royalty oil. The intellectual roots of the state's development policy toward oil and 
gas were well established before the oil wealth was realized. 
Evolution of the program 
 Frustration with federal control of fisheries (Cooley, 1963) and national forests 
(Rakestraw, 2002) played a prominent role in the drive for statehood. In his keynote 
address to the Alaska Constitutional Convention (Nov. 8, 1955), E.L. Bartlett reflected 
prevailing views when he said: 
...The financial welfare of the future state and the well-being of its present 
and unborn citizens depend upon the wise administration and oversight of 
these developmental activities. Two very real dangers are present. The first, 
and most obvious, danger is that of exploitation under the thin guise of 
development. The taking of Alaska's mineral resources without leaving some 
reasonable return for the support of Alaska government and the use of all the 
people in Alaska will mean a betrayal in the administration of the people's 
wealth. The second danger is that outside interests, determined to stifle any 
6 
development in Alaska which might compete with their activities elsewhere, 
will attempt to acquire great areas of Alaska's public lands in order not to 
develop them until ... they see fit. [emphasis in original] (quoted in Fischer, 
1975: 131) 
 Delegates clearly had Bartlett's ideas in mind when they drafted Article VIII, 
section 1 of the Alaska Constitution, which reads, "It is the policy of the State to 
encourage the settlement of its land and the development of its resources by making 
them available for maximum use consistent with the public interest"; and section 2: "The 
legislature shall provide for the utilization, development, and conservation of all natural 
resources belonging to the state, including land and waters for the maximum benefit of 
its people." But as a consensus document, the language is suitably vague. To some 
Alaskans, state ownership of petroleum and other resources gave the government the 
opportunity to push aggressively for specific utilization and development projects that 
were deemed in the public interest. This perspective is closely aligned with the so-called 
owner-state model of governance championed by former governor Walter Hickel (2002). 
To others, the public interest was better served with the state taking a more passive 
stewardship role, leaving development decisions to private initiative and market forces.  
 Alaska's royalty-in-kind program resembles production-sharing contracts popular 
in the developing world in the sense that they reserve a share of the state's oil and gas 
to the state landowner for disposal to promote economic development. However, Alaska, 
like the federal government and other U.S. states, never considered creating a state oil 
company or entering the oil production business. The practice since statehood has been 
to lease lands competitively to private developers in arms-length transactions, much as 
economists argued was appropriate for federal lands (McDonald, 1979). The state 
retains a royalty share from its leases.2 Alaska law permits the Department of Natural 
Resources to take its royalty oil and gas in kind or in value (that is, letting the oil 
companies market it on behalf of the state). Many Alaskans believed that maximizing 
revenue from oil lands was the only legitimate role for the state. Others, however, 
favored taking the state's royalty share in kind and making it available to specific projects 
that would provide additional private-sector jobs, and possibly stimulate additional 
development. Jack Roderick, Commissioner of Natural Resources for Alaska's first 
governor, Bill Egan, reported that the governor saw a dual role for royalty-in-kind 
disposals: job creation and reduced costs for Alaskans. Roderick (1997: 401). 
  In this regard Alaska, differed from other states and the federal government, 
where the primary purpose of a royalty-in-kind option was to maximize revenue. Like 
production sharing contracts in developing countries, Alaska's choice to dispose of 
royalties in kind for any purpose other than revenue maximization subjected the program 
to charges of political favoritism, and potentially, corruption. This is exactly what 
transpired the first time that the Commissioner of Natural Resources entered into a 
royalty-in-kind contract during the first term of Governor HIckel, who followed Egan. In 
February 1969, Commissioner Kelley negotiated a deal to sell all the state's Cook Inlet 
royalty oil up to 15,000 barrels per day for eight years -- at that time all the state's royalty 
oil -- to a company called Alaska Oil and Refining Company. The company, which 
                                                          
2In 1979 Alaska's oil and gas leasing law was changed to give the state the option of net profit 
share leases that do not include a royalty share. However, that provision was used only one time 
-- in the 1979 Beaufort Sea sale -- and has not been used since. According to a former petroleum 
economist with the Department of Natural Resources, one reason that the state did not use its 
net profit share lease option is that these leases do not provide the state with royalty oil for 
disposition (Ed Phillips, personal communication). 
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appeared to have been created entirely for the purpose of purchasing Alaska's royalty 
oil, promised to build a refinery in Alaska and pay the state the same price for its oil as 
the producers received for theirs (the so-called in-value price). Suspicions deepened 
when the company merged five months later with Tesoro, a small independent oil 
company. Tesoro did immediately begin construction of a refinery to process the oil in 
Nikiski, north of Kenai, but the lack of transparency in the negotiations leading to the 
sale rankled legislators and created lingering doubts about whether the public interest 
had been served (Roderick, 1997: 248-249). 
 The euphoria over the $900 million brought in by the 1969 North Slope oil lease 
sale quickly diverted public attention from the Tesoro case. But legislative debate about 
the propriety of the 1969 royalty disposal continued, spilling over into the larger question 
of the appropriate state role in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) and other 
projects involving North Slope oil and gas. According to Roderick, things came to a head 
in a September 1973 special legislative session called by Gov. Egan (elected again after 
Hickel resigned) to address these issues. Roderick (1997: 367) called this a pivotal time 
in Alaska's political history, one of two times when the relationship between the state 
and the oil industry changed in a significant way.3 Legislators dropped a proposal for a 
20 percent equity ownership in TAPS and a right of way leasing law that could set tariffs, 
and raised severance taxes instead. The following year, the legislature rewrote the 
statutes governing royalty-in-kind disposals, in a bid to ensure transparency of 
negotiations for future sales of royalty oil and gas from Prudhoe Bay. 
 The 1974 statute set criteria and standards for the Commissioner of Natural 
Resources to meet in royalty-in-kind disposals (AS38.05.183). Royalty-in-kind disposals 
must be competitive unless the state's best interest required that they be noncompetitive 
(AS 38.05.183(c)), and earn at least as much as if the oil were taken in-value. Instate 
domestic and industrial needs had priority over export sales of royalty-in-kind oil and gas 
(AS 38.05.183(d)). AS 38.05.183(e) defined the constitutionally required "maximum 
benefits" to the state as based on cash, effects on the economy, benefits of instate 
processing, provision of products to benefit instate consumers, and specific criteria 
related to local economic development benefits. The 1974 statute also created a Royalty 
Oil and Gas Development Advisory Board (ROGDAB) which would hold public hearings 
on proposed sales, review benefit claims against the statutory criteria, and recommend 
to the legislature whether to ratify contracts (AS38.06).  
 The changed climate favoring transparency was evident in the way that governor 
Jay Hammond, who succeeded Egan, announced the next proposed royalty-in-kind sale: 
a proposal to sell Prudhoe Bay royalty gas in support of an "All-Alaska Pipeline."4 In a 
statewide radio address, the governor carefully articulated the reasons for his best-
interest finding. The rationale included how delivery of gas to tidewater improved the 
chances of using the gas for industrial purposes in Alaska, an assurance that royalty gas 
in-kind removed in Alaska would not be subject to federal regulation, and a negotiated 
"takeback" provision if a need developed for in-state use of the gas (Hammond, 1976). 
By the time Hammond left office in 1983, his administration had sufficiently 
institutionalized royalty disposals that his deputy commissioner, Geoffrey Haynes, found 
                                                          
3The other time was in 1981, when the legislature bowed to oil company pressure to revise its tax 
code. 
4The purchasers of the proposed contract were Tenneco (50% share), Southern Nat. Gas. Co. 
(25%), and El Paso Natural Gas Company, (the pipeline sponsor (25%). The contract was 
approved but never implemented because El Paso did not receive federal certification for the 
project. 
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it necessary to write a thick handbook explaining the process for the incoming 
commissioner (Haynes, 1983). 
Summary of Disposals 
 Between 1969 and 2003, slightly more than one-half of all Alaska state royalty oil 
was taken in-kind (Figure 2). Relatively little gas was taken in kind, however, despite 
several attempts5 The state sold 10.4 billion cubic feet -- about one-half of one-year's 
worth of Cook Inlet royalty gas -- to the local gas distributor, Alaska Pipeline Company 
(Enstar), from 1977 to 1984 (Division of Oil and Gas, 2004: 5.1). 
 





Source: 1969-1978, Berman et al. 
(1984); 1979-2003, Alaska Division of 
Oil and Gas Annual Reports
 
 
 Figure 3 shows the distribution over time of state royalty oil and the disposals by  
purchaser. Oil production began in 1958 on federal lands in the Cook Inlet region. 
Alaska received 90 percent of the revenue from this production but did not control 
disposition. Production on state-leased lands generating royalties for potential disposal 
in-kind commenced in 1966. State royalties dramatically increased with completion of 
TAPS in 1977. Figure 4 shows the distribution of cumulative Alaska oil royalty-in-kind 
disposals by purchaser through 2003. Two instate refiners -- Tesoro and Mapco (later 
Williams and now Flint Hills) -- each purchased nearly 40 percent of oil royalty-in-kind oil. 
Chevron (also an instate refiner), purchased another 10 percent. Two percent was sold 
to Golden Valley Electric Association (GVEA) -- the Fairbanks area electric utility -- for 
turbine fuel.6 Altogether, 94 percent of royalty-in-kind oil was sold to promote instate 
use, with the remainder sold in competitive auctions. Not all royalty disposals, as we 
shall see below, successfully served their intended purpose.  
                                                          
5In addition to the All-Alaska gas pipeline sale mentioned above, several natural gas pipeline 
companies and Dow-Shell acquired options to purchase large quantities of North Slope natural 
gas and gas liquids, but never exercised their options. This project is discussed further in the next 
section. 
6GVEA never took physical custody of the oil, but swapped the crude oil  in exchange for refined 
turbine fuel from Mapco (Alaska Division of Oil and Gas, 2004: 5-2). 
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Oil and Gas Annual Reports
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Evaluation of Royalty-in-Kind Dispositions 
 In order to evaluate the success or failure of Alaska's royalty-in-kind program, one 
needs answers to four main questions. The first and most obvious question is: "What 
facilities were constructed related to the program?" A second question would be, "What 
facilities were proposed and supported with RIK disposals but never opened for 
business? Third is the question of how much it cost the state and the taxpayers. How 
much more money might the state have made if they had sold all oil competitively? 
Finally, what can be said about the degree to which RIK oil and gas contracts might 
have been necessary to get the facilities constructed or their operations successful? 
Facilities constructed 
 When Alaska entered the union in 1959, no oil and gas processing facilities 
existed anywhere in the state. All petroleum products were imported from the lower '48 
states or abroad, and there was no natural gas distribution system.7 Table 1 summarizes 
Alaska oil and gas processing facilities constructed between 1959 and 2004. The table 
shows that many of the early Cook Inlet facilities were constructed without the benefit of 
any state royalty oil or gas. Chevron constructed the first modern oil refinery in Alaska in 
1963, although the company did purchase some royalty oil later. Faced with the need to 
make large expenditures to convert the refinery from Cook Inlet to North Slope feedstock 
as Cook Inlet production declined, Chevron closed and dismantled the plant in 1991, 
after 27 years in operation. 
 Other Cook Inlet facilities constructed in the early years, in addition to the Tesoro 
refinery mentioned above, were the Phillips-Marathon LNG plant and an ammonia-urea 
fertilizer plant, using natural gas as feedstock. The Collier Chemical Company, later 
merged into Unocal, built the fertilizer plant to serve Pacific Rim demand. Unocal sold 
the plant to Agrium in 2000. After North Slope oil started flowing through TAPS, two oil 
refineries were built near Fairbanks and a third was constructed in Valdez. All three take 
oil from TAPS, refine it into products for Alaska markets, and return the residual back to 
the TAPS oil stream. They pay a fee, called a Quality Bank adjustment, for reducing the 
quality of the oil stream. Earth Resources (later Mapco), a partnership involving the 
Doyon regional native corporation, built the largest of these refineries. The Mapco 
refinery, later sold to Williams, which recently sold it to Flint Hills, has been expanded 
several times over the years. Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, another Alaska Native 










                                                          
7A small oil refinery had been operation in Katalla in the early part of the 20th century but burned 
down in the 1930s (Rakestraw, 2002). 
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Table 1. Alaska Oil and Gas Processing Facilities Constructed 
 
 




Products Destination Status 
(2/2005) 
Conoco-Phillips Prudhoe Bay 1975? Crude oil 14,000 b/d No Diesel Prudhoe Bay Operating 
Conoco-Phillips Kuparuk 1981 Crude oil 14,000 b/d No Diesel Kuparuk Operating 
Flint Hills 
(Williams/Mapco) 
North Pole 1977 Crude oil 220,000 b/d yes Gasoline Alaska Operating 
   Jet fuel Alaska 
   Diesel  Alaska 
   Gas oil Alaska 
   Asphalt Alaska 
   Residual Returned to 
TAPS 
Petro Star North Pole 1985 Crude oil 15,000 b/d Yes Kerosene Alaska Operating 
   Jet fuel Alaska 
   Diesel Alaska 
   Residual Returned to 
TAPS 
Petro Star Valdez 1992 Crude oil 46,000 b/d Option, not 
exercised 
Jet fuel Operating 
   Diesel 
   Residual Returned to 
TAPS 
Tesoro Nikiski 1969 Crude oil 72,000 b/d Yes Gasoline Alaska Operating 
   Jet Fuel Alaska 
   Diesel Alaska 
   Fuel oil Export 
   Asphalt Alaska 
   Propane Alaska 
   Sulfur Lower '48 
   Residual Lower '48, 
export 
Chevron Nikiski 1963 Crude oil 18,000 b/d Initially no, 
later yes 
Naptha Lower 48 Closed in 
1991 
   Jet fuel Alaska 
   Diesel Alaska 
   Fuel oil Lower '48 
   Asphalt Alaska 
Conoco-Phillips-
Marathon 













No Ammonia Export Operating 
below 
capacity 
   Urea 




 Figure 5 illustrates the magnitude of the benefits to the Alaska regional economy 
generated by the facilities listed in Table 1. In 2003, the six major facilities employed 685 
workers on an average annual basis. Agrium was the largest employer, with nearly 40 
percent of the total, followed by Tesoro. The jobs generate a payroll of roughly $550 
million annually (precise figures are considered proprietary). The contribution that these 
facilities make to the local property tax base is about equal to the annual payroll. Alaska 
has no state property tax for oil and gas processing facilities, but all these facilities are 
located in local governments -- the Kenai Peninsula Borough, the Fairbanks North Star 
Borough, and the city of Valdez -- that levy property taxes to support schools and other 
local government activities. Tax rates vary by jurisdiction, but these capital-intensive 
plants have probably allowed the boroughs to reduce their overall tax rates somewhat.  



















Petro Star North Pole
Williams refinery
Tesoro refinery+pipeline
Sources: Employment: Alaska Department of Labor, Research and 
Analysis; Property Tax Assessments: Kenai Peninsula Borough, Fairbanks 
North Star Borough, City of Valdez Assossors  
 
 
 The economic benefits that Figure 5 summarizes leave out information for the two 
small North Slope, built by Arco Alaska (now Conoco-Phillips) to serve oilfield 
operations. Figures for employment and assessed value for these refineries are 
relatively small and not separately reported from those of the oil production operations.  
Facilities proposed but not constructed 
 Table 2 summarizes Alaska oil and gas transportation and processing facilities 
that were proposed, and supported by royalty-in-kind disposals, but never constructed. 
All three were massive undertakings conceived during the national energy crisis in the 
late 1970s. None of the three could meet a market test after oil and gas wellhead prices 
were deregulated in the early 1980s. 
 Alaska Petrochemical Company (Alpetco) was the winning bidder in the first 
solicitation for offers to purchase royalty-in-kind oil from Prudhoe Bay. Alpetco, a 
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partnership of Alaska Interstate (later Enstar) (60%), Alaska Consolidated Shipping 
(itself a consortium of Native corporations and Seatrain) (20%), and Barbour Oil (20%), 
proposed to build a world-scale oil-based petrochemical plant (see Table 2). The plant, 
to be located at tidewater in Southcentral Alaska, would produce up to 2.1 million 
pounds per year of polyethylene, polypropylene, styrene and similar products. It would 
cost an estimated $1.5 billion to build, and require an additional $400 million of working 
capital, ultimately generating a $2.3 billion tax base. Construction would require 3,500 to 
4,000 temporary workers, while operations would generate 2,000 permanent jobs 
(Alaska Petrochemical Company, 1977). In 1978, the state agreed to sell up to 150 
thousand barrels per day (Mb/d) of royalty oil for 27 years to support the project. After 
review by the ROGDAB, the legislature approved the contract, with minor amendments 
(Haynes, 1983). 
 
Table 2. Proposed Alaska Oil and Gas Facilities Not Constructed, Receiving 
Royalty-In-Kind Contracts or Options 
Owner Location Start Feedstock Capacity Royalty-in-
kind 
Products Destination 









Alaska Oil Co. 
(Alpetco) 
Valdez 1977 Crude oil 150,000 b/d Yes, 
renegotiate
d 
Polyethylene Lower '48, 
export 
   Polypropylene Lower '48, 
export 
   Styrene Lower '48, 
export 
Alpetco Valdez 1980 Crude oil 100,000 b/d Yes, 
terminated 
Naptha Lower '48, 
export 
   Olefins Lower '48, 
export 
Dow-Shell Valdez 1982 Natural gas 
liquids 
210,000 b/d Option, not 
exercised 
Ethylene Lower '48, 
export 
   Polyethylene Lower '48, 
export 
   Ethylene glycol Lower '48, 
export 
 
 In early 1980, U.S. oil markets were deregulated, rapidly changing the market 
outlook for Alaska oil. That May, the parties agreed to Alpetco's request to amend the 
contract to construct. By then, the project's sponsor had changed to the Alaska Oil 
Company, whose major partner was Charter Oil, a Caribbean refiner. Alpetco's new 
partnership proposed a 100 Mb/d refinery in Valdez to produce Naptha and Olefins for 
further processing elsewhere. Alpetco would receive 75 Mb/d beginning July 18, 1980, 
until the refinery was operational. At that point, the volume would rise to 100 Mb/d. The 
market outlook continued to deteriorate for Alpetco's project. One year later, the 
company abandoned the refinery project, and its contract was terminated in January 
1982.  
 As mentioned above, the state entered into a contract to sell Prudhoe Bay royalty 
gas to a consortium including El Paso pipeline, the sponsor of the All-Alaska gas 
pipeline project. When the federal government selected the Alaska Natural Gas 
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Transportation System (ANGTS) as the preferred route for the project, a second 
proposal emerged for a natural gas liquids (NGL) pipeline following the route El Paso 
had proposed. After reviewing proposals from several contenders, the state selected a 
consortium headed by Dow Chemical and calling itself the Dow-Shell Group to perform a 
detailed feasibility study of the project. As outlined by the proposers, the project would 
manufacture 210 Mb/d of ethane and liquified petroleum gasses (LPG) -- propane, 
butane, etc. -- into petrochemicals for export (Dow-Shell Group, 1980; 1981). The project 
entailed a complex of four interrelated facilities costing roughly $7 billion, including: 
1. a $1 billion plant on the North Slope to extract NGLs from produced gas;  
2. a 20" pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez or  Cook Inlet, costing $2.3 billion; 
3. a $175 million fractionation plant to separate ethane from the LPGs; 
4. a petrochemical plant using 90Mb/d of ethane feedstock, costing $3.5 billion. 
 The petrochemical infrastructure would develop in two phases. In phase 1, the 
plant would have the capacity to produce up to 4 million lbs/year of ethylene, 
polyethylene, and ethylene glycol. In phase 2, capacity would expand to produce 
another 3.5 million pounds of derivative products. Peak construction employment would 
top 11,000, while 3,500 permanent workers would be needed for operations in phase 1, 
and 6,800 in phase 2. 
 In addition to a commitment from the state to sell its entire royalty share of NGLs, 
Dow-Shell had obtained a right of first refusal from Arco, and an agreement to negotiate 
in good faith with Sohio. Exxon, the other major North Slope owner, refused to negotiate 
with Dow-Shell, and instead pursued its own feasibility study. Dow-Shell's (1981) 
detailed feasibility study concluded that crude oil prices would have to remain at $38 (in 
1981 prices) to make the NGL pipeline feasible. Shortly after releasing the feasibility 
study, world oil prices started to decline. Dow-Shell backed out of the project in 1982, 
citing adverse market trends. 
 The first North Slope royalty-in-kind solicitations and the Alpetco and Dow-Shell 
bids spawned much debate among Alaskans about whether petrochemical development 
at this scale was appropriate for the state. Although no royalty hydrocarbons ever made 
their way into a petrochemical product, the official deliberations created a litany of 
engineering and market feasibility studies. Mostly funded by the state, the state's urgent 
need to understand the parameters and implications of the industry spread a windfall to 
engineering firms and other consultants in the state and around the nation. 
 Since the Alpetco-Dow-Shell episode, state officials have been more cautious 
about approving royalty oil and gas sales other than for in-state refining. Several gas and 
NGL offers have been made in recent years. Agrium requested Cook Inlet royalty gas at 
a low price, but the state balked with other gas purchasers objected. Williams once 
expressed interest in buying North Slope NGLs for a petrochemical plant, but backed out 
before making a formal offer when it determined that transportation costs made it 
infeasible to ship ethylene or polyethylene to the Japanese market.8 The state continues 
to get expressions of interest, some more credible than others. The state has not kept a 
comprehensive record of denied requests. According to Kevin Banks, manager of the 
                                                          
8The state has also recently tried to use its royalty gas a leverage to shape the course of 
negotiations over a North Slope natural gas pipeline. Anadarko and Encana were awarded 
contract for the option to take up to 70% of the state's North Slope gas royalty share, giving them 
a right to claim capacity of a common pipeline carrier. The idea was to force the main North 
Slope producers to increase the design capacity of the pipeline to encourage gas exploration. 
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program for DNR, most smaller traders lose interest as soon as they see the 
bureaucratic process involved in obtaining a best-interest finding that is required to 
complete a sale (Kevin Banks, personal communication, 8/05/04). 
How much did RIK disposals cost the state? 
 By statute, the state must earn at least as much from a royalty-in-kind disposal as 
it would earn if the oil had been taken in-value: the default method. No one has ever 
challenged a sale on the grounds that it failed to achieve this statutory requirement. So 
leaving aside the administrative cost of the analyses leading to the requisite best-interest 
findings, one could argue that the burden or proof would be on detractors to prove that 
the program has cost the state anything at all. In truth, however, the question is not so 
easy to answer. 
 Most royalty-in-kind disposals involved contracts with a pricing provision that 
specifies that the purchaser will pay the royalty-in-value price, or a slight premium above 
it. While this should in principle have guaranteed that the state not lose money on RIK 
sales, the state and producers have been in litigation over some aspect or another of in-
value royalty accounting for more than 25 years (the so-called Amerada-Hess case). 
Various aspects of the lawsuit have been settled out of court, but not until years had 
passed from the royalty sales. Limitations of contracts and the passage time have made 
it difficult if not impossible for the state to collect from all past royalty purchasers when it 
receives retroactive payments from producers in an in-value settlement. The state must 
negotiate a separate settlement for each contract (assuming that the firm that held the 
contract is still in business). The price in the most recent contract with Williams (Flint 
Hills) is not directly tied to the in-value price. A full and accurate retrospective accounting 
of the RIK program would be a monumental undertaking.9 
 Arguably, however, the correct test should not be based on in-value prices but on 
whether the state expected to receive at least as much over the long term from its RIK 
sales as it could have expected to have received from the best opportunity available at 
the time. Unfortunately, there are also many reasons why the comparison of expected 
sales receipts to the opportunity cost would be difficult to make over the years. Why this 
might be true will become clearer after a brief historical review of the supply and demand 
for Alaska's oil, natural gas, and manufactured hydrocarbon products. 
 First of all, most RIK disposals are long-term contracts. Available market indicators 
for oil and gas reflect short-term, or spot prices. The spot market is extremely volatile, 
and often diverges substantially from long-term conditions. The outcomes of the state's 
few competitive short-term disposals illustrate the difficulty of comparing the two markets 
at any given time. 
 As illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, the state sold about 6 percent of its oil in 
competitive sales, totaling about 50 million barrels. In the first North Slope competitive 
sale, held in 1981 at a time when the state believed that the in-value price was below the 
true market value, the average premium of winning bidders was $2.57 above in-value. 
All purchasers in this contract ended up losing money. When it came time to start taking 
the oil several months later, prices had slid, sending one firm into bankruptcy and 
causing another to default (Haynes, 1982). Over the life of the one-year contracts, I 
estimate that the state had received less than $1.82 on average above in-value, not 
                                                          
9DNR staff did at one time attempt to construct a retrospective analysis of in-kind vs. in-value 
sales prices for royalty oil. However, this analysis was never published, due to doubts among 
agency staff about its accuracy (Kevin Banks, personal communication). 
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counting substantial legal costs to settle with the largest purchaser. Desiring to avoid 
repeating this experience in the next competitive sale (1985), the state allowed 
purchasers an option of early termination. Only three of seven contracts in that sale 
lasted the full year. The state also offered up to 4,000 barrels a day in competitive sales 
of Cook Inlet oil for export, beginning in 1987, with a Taiwanese company picking up the 
contract. In 1991 after the eruption of Mt. Redoubt temporarily shut down operations at 
the Cook Inlet westside oil terminal, the company claimed force majeure and backed out 
of the contract. 
 Second, both spot and long-term markets for Alaska oil have been replete with 
market distortions, causing the value of Alaska oil to diverge from what free, competitive 
markets would signal. These distortions arose from federal and state regulation, 
combined with imperfect competition. Between 1974 and 1980, the federal government 
controlled wellhead oil prices throughout the nation. Cook Inlet and North Slope oil had 
different regulatory status and traded at very different prices.10 When Congress 
authorized TAPS in 1973, it prohibited exports of Alaska oil. This created a surplus of oil 
on the U.S. west coast, which kept prices for Alaska oil from rising as fast after 
deregulation as they did elsewhere. Shipping between U.S. ports was subject to the 
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act), which required that products move in U.S.-
built tankers operated by U.S. crews. This increased shipping costs substantially and 
further depressed Alaska wellhead prices. 
 The major Alaska oil producers enjoyed significant market power in west-coast 
markets. Rather than engage in arms-length sales that might reveal the profitability of 
their Alaska production, these firms sold most of their Alaska oil to their own refineries at 
artificial transfer prices. One way that they used their market power was to divert some 
oil through the Panama Canal to the U.S. gulf coast at an apparent loss, in order to 
relieve downward pressure on west-coast prices. Alpetco had proposed its refining and 
petrochemical project in the midst of these distortions. Refined products, unlike crude oil, 
could be exported in foreign vessels at unregulated competitive prices. Export refinery 
economics were therefore based on a series of market distortions created by the 
combination of the export ban on crude oil, the resulting west-coast surplus, the lack of 
transparency in netback prices, and the ability to avoid the Jones Act. When just one of 
these pillars of this structure gave way -- wellhead price regulation -- the project was 
revealed to be uneconomic, and started to unravel. 
 Still another regulatory artifact affecting in-value in oil prices and the value of RIK 
oil relates to price adjustments for oil of differing characteristics. TAPS ships oil 
commingled from several different fields with varying chemical properties. Fields 
producing lower quality oil pay a fee into a Quality Bank, which pays out to fields 
producing higher quality oil. Alaska refineries at North Pole and Valdez also pay into the 
Quality Bank when they discharge their residual oil back into TAPS. The Quality Bank 
charges, like other aspects of royalty pricing, reflect a legal settlement that mediates 
conflicting interests over a variety of issues. The state obtained a Quality Bank 
settlement that favored the TAPS refineries, to the displeasure of the refineries' main 
competitor: Tesoro. 
                                                          
10 In 1980, when Congress deregulated oil prices, it passed the Windfall Profits Tax. This tax had 
a variable rate depending on the previous regulatory status of the oil. Cook Inlet oil was taxed at 
the highest rate (90% of the difference between the market and the previous regulated price). 
State royalty oil was exempt from taxation. The tax phased out when the oil market collapsed in 
1986.  
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 The history of Alaska natural gas markets is likewise convoluted. Cook Inlet gas 
was mostly developed during the era of wellhead price regulation. Under wellhead price 
regulation, consumer prices were based on historical cost, without reference to current 
supply and demand conditions. During the late 1970s, this practice resulted in acute gas 
shortages in lower '48 states, leading to passage in 1978 of the Natural Gas Policy Act 
(NGPA). NGPA further extended regulation to allocate gas to preferential uses. Alaska 
won an exemption from some aspects of NGPA, allowing it to continue process natural 
gas into fertilizer and LNG for export, as well as burn gas to generate electric power, as 
these activities were being curtailed elsewhere in the nation. It was in this environment 
that the NGL-based petrochemical project appeared. Petrochemicals manufactured from 
NGLs were exempt from price regulation. If exported, they could also avoid the Jones 
Act shipping cost penalty. The phased deregulation of natural gas in the 1980s began 
shifting U.S. natural gas supplies toward higher-valued uses. Concurrently, Dow-Shell 
lost interest in its Alaska petrochemical project. 
 These array of distortions in oil and gas markets make it extremely difficult to 
determine ex-post whether the state's expected revenues from RIK sales matched or 
exceeded the expected revenues from the best alternative option. It would have been 
impossible to expect that the state could have made this determination at the time. It 
remains unclear that the program made any significant difference in the royalty revenues 
that would otherwise have been received. The slight premium over in-value prices must 
be balanced against the cost of administration, especially in dealing with the failed 
contracts. 
Role of RIK contracts 
 If the net cost of the program was small, one must ask, then, whether the program 
produced any significant economic benefits for the state and for society? If so, were the 
RIK contracts important to the success of projects that generated these benefits? 
Arguably, the wages and taxes paid were just reallocations of economic activity and did 
not consist of true benefits. Alaska is an open economy, with net migration balancing 
labor markets relatively quickly. Workers constructing and operating Alaska oil and gas 
processing plants probably would not have moved to Alaska if these plants had not been 
built. Once here, they need more local government services which the larger tax base 
can provide. The local economy is larger, but economic well-being has improved 
relatively little. 
 What about benefits to Alaska consumers from import substitution? Figure 6 
shows the approximate distribution of products produced. These percentages varied 
over time depending on market conditions, and the exact distribution at any given time is 
proprietary. However, the figure gives a snapshot of the approximate product mix. The 
largest share of production is residual oil, which is all exported from the state into 
competitive world markets. Three products -- jet fuel, gasoline, and number 2 diesel -- 
dominate the output of Alaska refineries marketed within the state. 
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Source: estimated from Alaska Division of Oil and Gas Annual 
Reports and data provide by the refining companies  
 
Figure 7 compares price differentials over time calculated from EIA data for distillate 
fuels (diesel), jet fuel, and motor gasoline. The five to ten-cent premium in the 1970s 
largely reflects the transportation cost differential. After 1980, competition between 
Mapco and Tesoro appears to have periodically given Alaska consumers substantial 
diesel price savings of up to $0.20 per gallon. Substantial gasoline price savings also 
appeared in 1991 and again after 1998. Jet fuel prices have also been drifting down 
since 1991, at a time when Alaska refineries have continued to raise jet fuel production, 
suggesting a benefit from competition of a few cents per gallon. The price differentials in 
Figure 7 show no huge savings, but do suggest that Alaska consumers and businesses 
have benefited measurably from the competition among Alaska refineries. 
 





























 If RIK contracts did not involve a subsidy, then were they really needed for the 
success of the projects they supported? Royalty-in-kind contracts at fair market value 
provided three direct benefits to the purchasers. First, the long-term contracts provided 
an element of security from the volatility of spot oil markets. Large integrated oil 
producers enjoyed this advantage, and the state's contracts helped level the playing field 
for independent refiners like Tesoro and Mapco. The security from spot market 
fluctuations played a significant role in financing refinery expansion. For example, in 
1992, Petro Star obtained an option to buy RIK oil to start a refinery in Valdez. After it 
was able to obtain financing, the company decided it did not need the oil, and elected 
not to exercise its option (Alaska Division of Oil and Gas, 2004L 5-2). A second, related 
advantage that the contracts provide independent refiners is the diversification of 
supplies, in particular, a source outside major oil company control. The major North 
Slope producers may be perceived to have a vested interest in restraining competition in 
the west Coast market, which includes Alaska. Once it was clear that the new refineries 
were going to be built, the producers appeared to have been willing to sell them oil at 
competitive prices. 
 If RIK contracts have these advantages, then why has the state not elected to take 
more of their oil and gas in-kind? In general, according to DNR staff, the refiners have 
not asked for more oil. They pay a slight premium for long-term contract, and appear 
comfortable with buying the rest of their needs from the producers (Kevin Banks, 
personal communication). 
 
Conclusions: Lessons Learned 
 Alaska's royalty-in-kind program has fostered the development of a local refining 
industry. The refining plants have employed relatively few workers but contributed 
significantly to local tax bases. Competition from Alaska refiners appears to have 
provided benefits to Alaska consumers and businesses. Instate refining has not only 
made a direct value-added contribution to the economy, it presumably has made an 
indirect contribution to diversification by substituting instate-manufactured fuel for 
imported fuel with at least some reduction in price. Since many important Alaska 
industries are fuel-intensive, any reduction at all in their fuel costs is potentially 
significant. 
 Political pressure to give away the state's resources to project sponsors promising 
economic benefits has been muted by the state's dependence on royalty revenues. The 
constitutional amendment that created the Permanent Fund requires that at least 25 
percent of royalty revenue be deposited into the fund. The distribution of Permanent 
Fund Dividends to residents ensures that citizens, not just politicians, have a direct stake 
in the tradeoff between development and revenues. The Permanent Fund Dividend 
effect will likely protect the transparency that the program has enjoyed since the 1974 
legislative amendments. 
 The successes and failures of the program suggest four lessons for development 
policy for Alaska and elsewhere. The first lesson is an affirmation of the benefits of 
transparency. A bad proposal is likely to wither under public scrutiny. Alaska was very 
fortunate to have avoided the potential economic disaster that would have occurred if it 
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had embarked on either of the massive proposed petrochemical development schemes. 
Because cautious state officials had built milestones that Alpetco and Dow-Shell had to 
meet before they received additional help, both companies withdrew from their contracts 
early before they could inflict serious losses on the state. 
 The second lesson is that projects that rely on free market forces are more likely to 
succeed in the long run than projects built around regulatory policies or economic 
distortions. Market distortions are inherently arbitrary and ephemeral. They can change 
rapidly due to factors unrelated to Alaska conditions or to global supply and demand. 
The political risk of relying on these incentives only compounds the inherent economic 
risks that all projects face. 
 A third lesson to draw from Alaska's RIK program is that import substitution is as 
effective as exports for providing economic benefits. In some cases, import substitution 
can be preferable, as in the case of Alaska fuels, where it might reduce the cost of a 
critical imported input to a broad range of industrial activities. 
 The final lesson is that projects that can start at a small scale and expand 
gradually over time are more likely to succeed than ones that require a huge, risky up-
front investment. Alaska's main refineries all started relatively small, and have made a 
series of upgrades over the years to keep pace with market opportunities. Today, the 
combined capacities of the two largest refineries substantially exceed the proposed size 
of Alpetco's export refinery. But unlike Alpetco, which had to raise $1.5 billion at one 
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